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ABSTRACT
This Article considers methods by which state appellate court judges
are selected. It focuses on the evolution of and rationale for the so-called
merit-selection system, a hybrid approach that prevails in a substantial
number of jurisdictions. Under merit selection, there is an initial
gubernatorial appointment based on recommendations from a
nominating committee and a retention election, which is limited to a
single candidate and a single question: whether the initially appointed
appellate judge should be retained so as to serve a new term. The
retention election is a form of election that satisfies states’ requirements
that judges be elected. But the limits on access to the retention-election
ballot pose substantial issues under the Supreme Court's ballot-access
cases.The Article recognizes that merit selection has been challenged
under state and federal constitutional theories but not under the ballotaccess cases, which may prove to be the Achilles Heal of the retentionelection system. Strict scrutiny applies to the total foreclosure of access
to an election ballot, and the strict-scrutiny standard applies to judicial
elections. Strict scrutiny requires consideration of alternatives, such as
contested elections or judicial appointments. While merit-selection
systems have long been challenged yet never toppled, consideration of
the ballot-access cases may result in a different outcome, as judicial
retention elections serve as a complete bar to the ballot for all candidates
other than the candidate who seeks retention for a new term.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The method by which state appellate court judges are selected has
been a contested issue for a long time. This Article will discuss the
various perspectives on the issue—including their respective
drawbacks and advantages—and describe the evolution of the so-called
“merit-selection” approach, a hybrid process that prevails in a
substantial number of states. The Article will conclude that a federal
constitutional vulnerability likely serves as an Achilles Heel to the
merit-selection system. That system is characterized by (i) initial
gubernatorial appointment as constrained by recommendations from a
nominating commission, and (ii) a retention election, an election
limited to a single candidate and a single question: whether the initially
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appointed appellate judge is to be retained.1
The vulnerability arises from the nature of the retention election.
The strategy of merit selection is to limit the number of the candidates
in the retention election, so that the voters’ choice is not among
candidates, but for a single candidate, to determine whether he or she
is to be retained in office for a new term of years. That strategy is a form
of limitation on access to the election ballot and is in tension with the
line of cases that places constraints on a state’s ability to restrict
candidate access to the ballot. The retention election that is at the core
of merit selection has not previously been analyzed through the prism
of the ballot-access cases.2
While the method of selecting state appellate judges is not a new
issue, it remains a highly controversial one. Litigation challenging the
merit-selection system has customarily focused on state constitutional
issues—whether a process that includes a retention election qualifies
as an “election” under state constitutional provisions that require
appellate judges to be elected by the people.3 After struggling with this
issue, courts have uniformly found that retention elections do qualify
as elections under such state constitutional provisions.4
Dissatisfaction with the merit-selection system has also led to some
federal constitutional challenges. The focus of these federal challenges
has been on the composition and electoral constituency for the
nominating commissions.5 These challenges have been framed in part
by a thoughtful analysis of Professor Nelson Lund, which appeared in
2011.6 Three circuit courts have reviewed and rejected these challenges,
although in one of the cases each of the three judges on the Court of
Appeals panel put forth a separate analysis (two concurrences and a
dissent).7 The conclusion here, because the issue has not previously

1. See infra notes 62-66.
2. See infra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
3. E.g., Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409 (Tenn. 2014).
4. E.g., id.
5. E.g., Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1998); Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889 (9th
Cir. 2010); Dool v. Burke, 497 Fed. Appx. 782 (10th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct.
992 (2013); Moncier v. Haslam, 570 Fed. Appx. 553 (6th Cir. 2014).
6. See generally Nelson Lund, May Lawyers Be Given the Power to Elect Those Who
Choose Our Judges? “Merit Selection” and Constitutional Law, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1043
(2011) (discussing federal challenges to merit selection). For a response to Lund, on Lund’s own
terms, see Cort A. Van Ostran, Justice Not for Sale: A Constitutional Defense of the Missouri Plan
for Judicial Selection, 44 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 159 (2014).
7. See Dool, 497 Fed. Appx. at 784–95 (affirming the constitutionality of Kansas’ election
process with concurring and dissenting opinions).
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been properly framed or characterized, is that the challengers’
disaffection rings true from a federal constitutional perspective.
The very design of the merit-selection structure has a federal
constitutional Achilles Heel, specifically with the retention election.
The challengers’ dissatisfaction has a strong constitutional provenance,
but the challenges have not been dressed up in quite the right
constitutional suit of clothing. The result has been that the
constitutional challenges to this point have been deemed wide of the
mark. The contention of this Article is that a properly directed and
focused federal constitutional challenge through the Court’s ballotaccess jurisprudence is worthy of serious analysis, should be viewed
from the perspective of prospective voters, and must be subjected to
heightened (“strict”) scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s ballot-access
jurisprudence.
At this point, please indulge a brief analytical detour, a Baedeker to
other examples of constitutional challenges that failed when
constitutionally mis-attired, but then succeeded when they were
dressed in constitutionally appropriate outfits. In Bendix Autolite Corp.
v. Midwesco Enterprises,8 Ohio tolled its statute of limitations for any
period that a person or a corporation was not “present” in Ohio.9 In
earlier litigation, G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn,10 the Supreme Court had
upheld, in a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, differential
treatment in terms of statutes of limitations for in-state and out-of-state
defendants.11 The Court in G.D. Searle recognized that a state could
permissibly make differential adjustments in the statutes of limitation
for the greater difficulty in serving nonresident corporations or persons
in contrast to in-state defendants.12 In Bendix Autolite, on the other
hand, the Court sided with challengers to the tolling of statutes of
limitations for nonresident entities.13 The successful challenge raised
claims of discrimination under the Commerce Clause, with the Court
acknowledging that “state interests that are legitimate for equal
protection or due process purposes may be insufficient to withstand
Commerce Clause scrutiny.”14 Identifying the appropriate
constitutional category and framing the issue in appropriate
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

486 U.S. 888 (1988).
Id.
455 U.S. 404 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 404–05.
Bendix Autolite, 486 U.S. at 888–89.
Id. at 894.
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constitutional clothes were essential to understanding the
constitutional flaw at issue.15
So it is with respect to the merit-selection system of appellate
judges. The constitutional vulnerability is the retention election—an
“election” under state constitutions that makes the merit-selection
system subject to federal constitutional election-law principles.16 After
all, what is the concept underlying the judicial retention election, which
is one of the critical pillars of merit selection? The foundation of this
electoral system is the fact that states limit access to the general
election ballot to a single candidate; therefore, the merit-selection
process is—and is designed to be—a mechanism for restricting access
to an election ballot to one person, and thereby barring access to the
election ballot by any other candidate. The retention-election form
effectively and purposefully bars independent candidates from access
to the election ballot.17 The preferred candidate is assured of no
electoral competitors. Such total restriction of access by an
15. Similar examples arise in the context of access to judicial proceedings and municipal
residency requirements for city workers and workers on city projects. Compare Neb. Press Ass’n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (holding that Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the accused a
public trial, does not give the public or the press a right of access to certain judicial proceedings),
with Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (deciding that First Amendment
requires public to have access to a criminal trial); McCarthy v. Phila. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S.
645 (1976) (rejecting equal protection challenge to municipal residency requirement for municipal
workers), and White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emps., Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (rejecting
Commerce Clause challenge to municipal residency requirements for city workers and city
contractors on city jobs) with United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S.
208 (1988) (subjecting municipal residency requirement for contractors on city construction
projects to heightened scrutiny under Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis).
16. In Sailors v. Bd. of Educ. of Kent Cnty., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), the Supreme Court declined
to apply election-law principles to an appointed county school board: “We find no constitutional
reason why state or local officers of the nonlegislative character involved here may not be
chosen . . . by some other appointive means rather than by an election.” Id. at 108. In the absence
of an election—and when no election is constitutionally mandated—election-law principles have
no application. Id. at 111. Sailors strongly suggests that there is no federal constitutional
requirement that state-court judges must be elected. A system of appointing state judges is not
subject to successful challenge under election-law principles. See Moncier v. Haslam, 570 Fed.
Appx. 553, 559 (6th Cir. 2014) (observing that “there is no federally protected interest in seeking
a state-court judgeship that, under state law (as interpreted by the state supreme court), already
has been lawfully filled by gubernatorial appointment”). That is, a person seeking a judicial
position “has no recognized right under the United States Constitution to run for an office that,
under state law, already has been filled” by gubernatorial appointment. Id.
17. For a recent case holding unconstitutional a provision “that effectively limits service on
state courts to members of the Democratic and Republican parties,” and thereby precludes
judicial service by independents, see Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 2019).
The Supreme Court reversed that decision on grounds that the challenger lacked standing.
Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020). The judicial positions involved in that case are unelected
positions and, therefore, not subject to the cases relating to elections. Sailors v. Board of Ed. of
Kent Cty., 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967).
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independent candidate to an election ballot is what has been called, in
another context,18 a “frontal assault” on a core constitutional interest
that the Supreme Court has recognized since the landmark case of
Williams v. Rhodes.19
The Supreme Court in Williams recognized federal constitutional
limits to government’s ability to preference the established parties,
Democrats and Republican, in terms of ballot access.20 Some state
interests might well justify some advantaging of the established parties,
but a state could not erect barriers to ballot access for new or third
parties that effectively precluded third parties from securing access to
an electoral ballot.21 Such preclusion of ballot access denies some
voters “not only a choice of leadership but a choice on the issues as
well.”22
The focus in Williams was ballot access for third parties, but the
Supreme Court quickly recognized that the First Amendment interests
of voters extended to independent candidates as well: the state “must
… provide feasible means for other political parties and other
candidates to appear on the general election ballot.”23 Independent
candidates must be assured reasonable access to the general election
ballot, and they cannot be forced to form a political party so as to
qualify for ballot access.24
The critical ballot-access interests at stake, as recognized in
Williams, are those of voters, who express their political preferences
through their votes for candidates for office.25 Restrictive ballot-access
laws “place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of
rights—the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of
political beliefs [protected by the First Amendment],26 and the right of
qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their
18. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’g v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (rejecting a claim
that a professional society’s anticompetitive rule on contract bidding could be justified because of
the “potential threat that competition poses to the public safety and the ethics of the profession”
as “nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act”).
19. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
20. Id. at 29.
21. Id. at 31.
22. Id. at 33.
23. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728 (1974).
24. Id. at 746.
25. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974) (“[V]oters can assert their preferences only
through candidates or parties or both.”); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983)
(agreeing with this proposition from Lubin).
26. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.7 (recognizing fundamental First Amendment rights
“implicated by restrictions on the eligibility of voters and candidates” to the election ballot).
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votes effectively”—rights that “rank among our most precious
freedoms.”27 When a state limits candidates’ access to the election
ballot, it restricts “the choices available to voters” and thereby “impairs
the voters’ ability to express their political preferences.”28 Since
“[o]verbroad restrictions on ballot access jeopardize … political
expression,”29 they are subject to strict scrutiny, with the state having to
show that its ballot-access restrictions are “necessary to serve a
compelling interest.”30
Although this point has not been addressed before in cases
involving merit selection, the ballot-access line of cases indicates that
the retention elections that form a critical component of merit selection
must be subjected to strict scrutiny, justified by the state as “necessary”
to serve an interest deemed “compelling.” The necessity inquiry
addresses the means adopted by a state to achieve a compelling
interest. Courts applying strict scrutiny consider alternatives available
through which a state can reasonably achieve its objectives. This
consideration of alternatives under strict scrutiny affords states little or
no deference.31 It is far from clear that a state can succeed in making
the type of showing required under strict scrutiny, unless a state could
somehow establish that something about judicial elections is inherently
different from other representative elections, such that the Court’s
traditional ballot-access analytical framework should not apply. Except
in narrow circumstances, such as First Amendment claims involving
personal campaign finance solicitation,32 the Supreme Court has
declined to carve out exceptions for judicial elections to conventional
election-law doctrine under strict scrutiny.33
27. Williams, 393 U.S. at 30; see also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 (“The impact of candidate
eligibility requirements on voters implicates basic constitutional rights”).
28. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
29. Id. at 186.
30. Id. at 184.
31. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 311 (2013) (explaining that government receives
“no deference” under strict scrutiny in means-ends analysis).
32. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 455 (2015) (upholding Florida’s law
restricting judges from personally soliciting campaign donations).
33. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (using strict scrutiny
to strike down Minnesota’s law that prohibited candidates for judicial office from announcing
their political views); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008) (upholding
New York’s system of choosing party nominees for the State Supreme Court); see also Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (applying Voting Rights Act, Section 2, to context of judicial
elections); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991) (applying Voting Rights Act, Section 5, in
context of judicial elections). But see Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973) (affirming without
opinion district court’s refusal to apply conventional one person, one vote rules to judicial election
context).
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This Article explores ballot-access issues related to merit-selection
systems by proceeding in four parts. First, it provides background
history on the development of judicial merit-selection systems and the
legal challenges these systems have faced. Then, it provides a thorough
constitutional analysis of ballot-access challenge issues, concluding that
retention elections cannot survive the strict scrutiny analysis to which
courts should subject them. After determining that the ballot-access
framework is the proper clothing that merit-selection system
challenges have been searching for, the Article explores one further
matter—raising and rejecting counterarguments derived from a faulty
comparison to recall elections, which are distinct from, but have some
interesting factual similarities to, judicial selection and judicial
retention elections.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Judicial Selection in the Nineteenth Century
Until the mid-nineteenth century, selection of state judges was
typically part of the political appointment process—a hodgepodge of
executive appointment and selection by legislatures.34 In 1832,
Mississippi became the first state to elect all its judges.35 The early state
initiatives to elect judges were aimed at divesting control of judges from
political officials, limiting judicial authority, and providing political
accountability and oversight to the voters.36
Part of the rationale for the evolution of the judicial election
method of selecting judges was the perceived need for courts to oversee
political institutions. Judges appointed by legislatures were deemed too
deferential to those legislative institutions that controlled judicial
appointments. An elected judiciary was thought to be independent—
i.e., independent of appointing legislatures and governors; such courts
could exercise stronger judicial review, holding political institutions
accountable by elected—and politically accountable—judges.37 And
there is evidence that elected judges embraced this role of overseeing
political institutions. In the mid-nineteenth century, courts were
aggressive in striking down statutes, leading to a “more widespread

34. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and
Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1074 (2010).
35. Id. at 1066.
36. Id. at 1072.
37. Id. at 1089.
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practice and acceptance of judicial review.”38
This was envisioned as a political role of courts, in aggressively
overseeing the conduct of the political branches. The early rationale for
judicial elections was a belief that judicial review would serve as an
effective majoritarian check on the political branches, with judicial
elections providing legitimacy and political accountability for that
expanded and enhanced judicial role.39 Judges would protect the
people from their government, and elections provided a political and
legitimating check on the judges.40
Over time, as courts developed counter-majoritarian and antipopulist theories and doctrines, the wisdom of the expanded political
role for courts was called into question. Courts were seen as opposing
democratizing initiatives; their political role became fodder for critics
who took issue with courts’ intrusion into the territory of the other
political branches. The policy push back took the form of expanding
judicial deference and, in turn, reducing the political dimensions of the
judicial role, as well as opposition to judicial elections, especially for
appellate courts.41 The practical problem was the widespread presence
in state constitutions of provisions assuring that state judges would be
elected by the people.42 The so-called merit-selection process was
developed in response to the desire for less politicization of courts and,
legally, as a work-around for the state constitutional requirements that
judges must be elected by the people.43
B. History of the Merit-Selection Process
Missouri was the first state to adopt a merit-selection process for
judges.44 Against a backdrop of Progressive Era reforms, Missouri
voters approved a merit-selection plan in 1940.45 The plan was designed

38. Id. at 1115.
39. Id. at 1128 (describing correspondence at the time that indicated a belief that “appointed
judges were cowed by the democratic legitimacy of legislators, but elections gave judges more
courage to assert their power on behalf of ‘the people.’”).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1142–45.
42. See id. at 1097 (“By 1860, out of thirty-one states in the Union, eighteen states elected
all of their judges, and five more elected some of their judges.”).
43. See F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in
the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 451–52 (2004) (describing the impetus for merit-selection
systems as “limit[ing] political influences on state judges”).
44. Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: The Least
Political Method of Selecting High Quality Judges, 74 MO. L. REV. 711, 723 (2009).
45. Id.
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to reduce the partisanship and corruption that had become rampant in
the selection of judges.46 Many states followed in Missouri’s footsteps,
adopting the merit-selection process, which came to be known as the
Missouri Plan.47
Before settling on a merit-selection process, Missouri experimented
with both gubernatorial judicial appointments and contested judicial
elections. The original Missouri constitution allowed the governor to
appoint judges for life, mirroring the federal system.48 In 1850, Missouri
amended its constitution to require contested judicial elections.49 That
decision was intended to make judges directly accountable to the voters
and to reduce the influence of the governor and the legislature over
judges.50
Contested judicial elections in Missouri quickly became highly
partisan and were largely controlled by powerful party bosses.51 In the
early 1900s, the Democratic political machine had almost complete
control of electoral politics in Missouri.52 This led to many elected
officials, including judges, being selected by a small number of party
bosses sitting in proverbial smoke-filled rooms.53 As a result, judges
were indebted to the Democratic political machine, and faced political
retribution if they did not rule as the party bosses wished them to.54
Missouri voters rejected the partisanship of contested judicial elections
in 1940,55 when the merit-selection process was incorporated into the
state’s constitution.56
Responding to corruption arising out of gubernatorial judicial
appointments, other states adopted merit-selection systems based on
the Missouri Plan. Kansas adopted the Missouri Plan in 1956 after a
scandal involving the state’s governor.57 After losing in the Republican
primary, the governor resigned his office.58 The chief justice of the state
46. Id.
47. See text accompanying notes 57-61, infra..
48. Stith & Root, supra note 44, at 720.
49. Id. at 721.
50. Id.
51. See Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan: A Dinosaur on the Edge
of Extinction or A Survivor in A Changing Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315, 318
(1997).
52. Id.
53. Stith & Root, supra note 44, at 721–22.
54. Id.
55. Daugherty, supra note 51, at 318.
56. Id.
57. Lund, supra note 6, at 1067.
58. Id.
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supreme court, a friend of the governor’s, resigned at the same time.59
The state’s lieutenant governor then became the state’s interim
governor and appointed the former governor to fill the newly created
vacancy on the state’s supreme court.60 This political horse trading
demonstrated that partisanship and corruption were not limited to
contested judicial elections, and gave momentum to the trend of states
adopting merit-selection systems in an attempt to insulate the judicial
selection process from political pressures. As of 2020, thirty-five states
and the District of Columbia used some form or component of a meritselection system.61
The Missouri Plan employs a three-step process for selecting judges,
which includes elements derived from the traditional systems of
gubernatorial judicial appointments and judicial elections.62 First, a
judicial commission solicits and evaluates applications for judicial
vacancies.63 The commission nominates three individuals it believes are
qualified to fill the vacancy and sends them to the governor for
consideration.64 Second, the governor selects one of the three nominees
and appoints that person to the bench.65 Third, the citizens of the state
vote in retention elections to determine whether the judge can remain
on the bench for a new term.66 In Missouri, judges are subject to
retention elections after a probationary period of one to two years.67 If
the judges are retained after this period, they serve a full term, after
which they are again subject to a retention election for another new
term.68
Membership on judicial commissions is typically dominated by
lawyers. Missouri’s Appellate Judicial Commission has seven members,
four of whom are lawyers, and three of whom are not.69 The lawyers
include a judge from the Missouri Supreme Court and lawyers from the
eastern, southern, and western districts of Missouri who are elected by
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Methods of Judicial Selection, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (last visited
July
22,
2020),
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state
(providing state-by-state analysis of judicial selection).
62. Stith & Root, supra note 44, at 725–26.
63. MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 10.02.
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their peers.70 The governor appoints one non-lawyer from each of these
districts.71 The other members serve staggered six-year terms.72
Other states have adopted modified versions of the Missouri Plan.
Prior to the passage of Amendment 2 in 2014,73 Tennessee used a meritselection system known as the Tennessee Plan.74 Tennessee’s
constitution contained a requirement that judges be elected by the
voters.75 The state fulfilled this requirement by making judges subject
to uncontested retention elections.76 Tennessee statutorily created a
Judicial Nominating Commission, which was responsible for submitting
three candidates to the governor when a judicial vacancy occurred.77
The governor then appointed one of these three nominees to fill the
vacancy.78 At the end of a judge’s term, the Judicial Performance
Evaluation Committee evaluated the judge.79 If the committee
recommended that the judge be retained, the judge was placed on the
ballot for an uncontested retention election.80 If the committee
recommended that the judge be replaced, a contested election was
held.81 Therefore, even though Tennessee’s constitution required
judicial elections, the Tennessee Plan was often functionally equivalent
to the Missouri Plan.
Tennessee amended its constitution in 2014 through Amendment 2
so that the governor is responsible for appointing appellate judges who
are confirmed by the state legislature.82 Under Amendment 2,
Tennessee continues to use uncontested retention elections.83

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Mo. Sup Ct. R. 10.03.
73. Tennessee’s voters ratified Amendment 2 in 2014, granting the governor the power to
appoint state appellate and Supreme Court judges, the legislature the power to confirm them, and
the voters the power to retain or not retain them in an election. The election takes place at the
completion of a term, which is eight years. See TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3. The ratification process
used for all state constitutional amendments was challenged in response to a separate,
controversial amendment on the ballot that same year. However, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
Tennessee’s amendment process in George v. Hargett, 879 F.3d 711, 730 (6th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 129 S.Ct. 239 (2018).
74. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 421–22 (Tenn. 2014).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 416
78. Id.
79. Id. at 421–22.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.

BLUMSTEIN_FORMATTED_4.5.22 (DO NOT DELETE)

JUDICIAL RETENTION

2022]

4/14/2022 4:53 PM

111

Tennessee’s constitution now mandates that the state’s appellate
judges, who have been appointed by the governor and confirmed by the
legislature, be placed on the ballot for retention elections at the end of
their terms, seeking a new term in office.84
C. Previous Challenges to Judicial Retention Elections
Uncontested judicial retention elections have been challenged on
both state and federal constitutional grounds. State constitutional
challenges have focused on whether judicial retention elections satisfy
constitutional requirements that appellate judges be elected by the
people. Federal constitutional challenges have focused on the
composition and electoral constituency of judicial commissions. None
of these challenges have succeeded in demonstrating that uncontested
judicial retention elections are unconstitutional.
In 2014, a five-member Special Supreme Court in Tennessee held
that the Tennessee Plan, which required appellate judges to appear on
the ballot in uncontested judicial elections, did not violate the state’s
constitution.85 The court rejected a claim that Tennessee’s constitution
required contested judicial elections.86 At the time, the Tennessee
Constitution stated that “Judges of the Supreme Court shall be elected
by the qualified voters of the State,” and that “[t]he Judges of the
Circuit and Chancery Courts, and of other inferior Courts, shall be
elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to which they
are to be assigned.”87 The challenger argued that uncontested retention
elections violated the state’s constitution “because the phrase ‘shall be
elected by the qualified voters’ in the Tennessee Constitution
require[d] that the voters be given a choice of two or more candidates
in a contested popular election.”88
The court held that the phrase “elected by the qualified voters”
included retention elections, as well as contested elections.89 The Court
reasoned that “the Tennessee Plan’s retention election ballot fully
meets the definition of ‘elect’ because it is a process of choosing
someone for public office by voting.”90 While retention elections
feature only one candidate, the ballot still gives voters a choice between
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 428.
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two alternatives, because they can choose whether the judge is retained
or replaced.91 Therefore, Tennessee’s merit-selection system was
upheld as constitutional under state law—a form of election as required
under the Tennessee Constitution.92
Several federal challenges have also been brought against state laws
establishing uncontested judicial retention elections. These challenges
have focused primarily on the racial effect of a Missouri Plan style of
judicial selection system under the Voting Rights Act; and whether the
makeup of state judicial committees violated the Voting Rights Act or
infringed on the Equal Protection rights of the voters participating in
the retention elections.
In 1998, in Bradley v. Work,93 the Seventh Circuit upheld Indiana’s
merit-selection process, which was closely modeled after the Missouri
Plan.94 The challenge under the Voting Rights Act addressed “the
system of appointment plus retention elections”95 and included a
challenge to the racially disproportionate effects that arose from the
composition of the judicial nominating committee.96 The court held that
a judicial-retention election was subject to the Voting Rights Act, even
in the context of a Missouri-Plan-style system in which judges are
initially appointed and “even though judges do not ‘represent’ anyone
in the same way a legislator does.”97 That is, the Voting Rights Act
applies to the “retention phase”98 of the “system of appointment plus
retention elections.”99 While it may appear “a bit unseemly to think of
the question of judicial retention as fundamentally the same as a bond
issue or a proposal to amend the state’s constitution,” these “questions
have the critical characteristic in common: it is the voters directly who
make the choice, through the casting of their ballots.”100 Accordingly,
the Voting Rights Act applied to judicial retention elections that
followed initial gubernatorial appointment—even if the Act would not
apply to the initial appointment process itself because it is not, by itself,

91. Id.
92. Id. at 429.
93. 154 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1998).
94. Id. at 710–11.
95. Id. at 706.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 709. The Seventh Circuit relied heavily on Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
See discussion infra Section III.C.
98. Bradley, 154 F.3d at 706.
99. Id. at 709.
100. Id. at 710.
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an election.101
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit held that the Board of Governors of the
Alaska Bar Association appointing three members to the state’s
Judicial Council did not constitute an Equal Protection violation.102
Historically, the makeup of the Judicial Council was modeled after the
Missouri Plan.103 The Council includes three non-attorneys appointed
by the governor and confirmed by the legislature, three attorneys, and
the chief justice of the Alaska Supreme Court.104 The state’s
constitution mandates that the three attorneys “shall be appointed for
six-year terms by the governing body of the organized state bar.”105
The plaintiffs argued that “all participants in the judicial selection
process must be either popularly elected or appointed by a popularly
elected official.”106 Therefore, the plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin
the operation of Alaska’s merit-selection process because three
members of the Judicial Council were selected by the Board of
Governors of the Alaska Bar Association.107 The Board of Governors
was elected by the membership of the Alaska Bar, not by the public at
large.108 The plaintiffs claimed that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment limits the appointment power to elected
officials.109
The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim.110
The court noted that the Supreme Court had previously allowed a
political party to appoint someone to fill an interim vacancy in the
Puerto Rico Legislature.111 The Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the appointment violated the Equal Protection Clause because the
political party was not made up of popularly elected officials.112

101. Id. at 709 (“[A] state could avoid the Voting Rights Act altogether by using a system of
appointed judges.”). On the merits, the Seventh Circuit held that there was not enough evidence
to find that the merit-selection system violated the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 710–11. The court
also held that the voters had not preserved their independent 14th and 15th Amendment
arguments on appeal but, in dicta, expressed skepticism that intentional race discrimination could
be established. Id. at 711.
102. Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2010).
103. Id. at 892.
104. Id. at 892–93.
105. Id. at 893.
106. Id. at 896.
107. Id. at 895.
108. Id. at 896 (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969)).
109. Id. at 898–99.
110. Id. at 899–900.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court had already
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the appointment power can only
be vested in elected officials.113
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit noted that even if the appointment
power was limited to elected officials, that principle was not violated in
Kirk.114 The court reasoned that the Judicial Council only had the
power to nominate candidates, not to make final judicial
appointments.115 Under the Missouri Plan, the power to appoint judges
is still vested in the popularly elected governor.116
The Tennessee Plan was also challenged in federal court in 2014.117
Herbert Moncier, who wished to fill a vacancy on the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals, argued that the state of Tennessee violated his
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to ballot access and political
association.118 The Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal of Moncier’s suit
due to lack of standing.119 The court explained that “[r]ather than
asserting a ‘particularized stake in the litigation,’ Moncier’s complaint
contained mostly general allegations that the manner in which
Tennessee selects and retains its appellate court judges violates his
rights and the rights of all Tennessee voters under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.”120 The court also noted that there was no
federally protected interest in seeking a state-court judgeship that had
already been lawfully filled by the governor.121
The Sixth Circuit was not required to rule on Moncier’s substantive
claims because Moncier did not have standing to challenge Tennessee’s
merit-selection system.122 If brought by a plaintiff with standing,
however, the ballot-access argument may prove to be the strongest
challenge to uncontested judicial retention elections. The Article now
turns to that issue.
III. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR BALLOT-ACCESS CHALLENGES
For over fifty years, the Supreme Court has recognized that access
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 900.
Id.
Id.
Moncier v. Haslam, 570 Fed. Appx. 553, 554 (6th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 555.
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 560.
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to the election ballot affects fundamental “overlapping” interests (i)
“of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs”
and (ii) “of qualified voters … to cast their votes effectively.”123
Restrictions on ballot access that impose “severe burdens” on these
interests are subject to strict scrutiny, necessitating a showing that they
are “narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest.”124
Ballot-access restrictions affect not only the interests of potential
candidates but also have an impact on the interests of voters—limiting
their range of choice among candidates.125 And the “impact of
candidate eligibility requirements on voters implicates basic
constitutional rights” of political association and voting rights.126 Ballotaccess restrictions also cannot be used to achieve impermissible
substantive objectives, such as imposing term limits.127 But states may
make use of ballot-access restrictions that “protect the integrity and
reliability of the electoral process itself.”128
This Part addresses the history and legal framework of
constitutional challenges to ballot-access restrictions. Ultimately, courts
will apply strict scrutiny and likely invalidate laws that unnecessarily
burden core associational rights of both candidates and voters. This
strict scrutiny standard has also been applied to First Amendment cases
in the context of judicial elections.
A. Ballot-Access Restrictions: A Look at the Cases
When addressing ballot-access issues, courts have recognized
competing values, working to balance the voting rights of citizens and
the policy goal of preserving the two-party system. The Supreme Court
addressed this conflict in 1968 in Williams v. Rhodes, striking down an
Ohio law that made it virtually impossible for third-party presidential
candidates to appear on the ballot.129 The Ohio law required new
political parties “to obtain petitions signed by qualified electors
totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the last preceding
123. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
124. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); see Williams, 393
U.S. at 31 (applying strict scrutiny).
125. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983). Cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 828–38 (1995) (recognizing significance of limiting ballot access as a
vehicle for imposing unconstitutional term limits); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001)
(recognizing the same).
126. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786.
127. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 828–38.
128. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9.
129. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968).
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gubernatorial election.”130 This represented a significantly higher
burden than that placed on the Democratic and Republican parties,
which were “allowed to retain their positions on the ballot simply by
obtaining 10% of the votes in the last gubernatorial election and need
not obtain any signature petitions.”131
The Court reviewed the Ohio law under a strict scrutiny standard
because it “place[d] burdens on two different, although overlapping,
kinds of rights—the right of individuals to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters,
regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.”132
The Court explained that the right to associate and form a political
party meant “little if that party could be kept off the election ballot and
denied an equal opportunity to win votes.”133 Additionally, the right to
vote is significantly limited if citizens only have the option to choose
between two parties, despite other parties wishing to appear on the
ballot.134
The Court noted the constitutional importance of both of these
rights. The right to political association is protected from federal
encroachment by the First Amendment and protected from state
encroachment by the Fourteenth Amendment.135 The Court also
emphasized the importance of the right to vote, stating that “[n]o right
is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we
must live.”136
The law could not survive strict scrutiny analysis because Ohio
“failed to show any ‘compelling interest’ which justifies imposing such
heavy burdens on the right to vote and to associate.”137 Ohio argued
that it had several compelling interests that supported the law. First, the
state argued that preserving the two-party system, which led to political
stability and compromise, represented a compelling interest.138 The
Court rejected that argument, noting that the Ohio law did not merely
favor the two-party system, but gave two specific parties, Democrats
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 31–32.
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and Republicans, a complete monopoly on access to the ballot.139 The
Court did not view preserving this monopoly as a compelling interest,
noting that competition in ideas is essential to the electoral process and
is furthered by allowing new political parties access to the ballot.140
Second, Ohio claimed it had an interest in ensuring that election
winners were the choice of a majority of voters, not merely a plurality.141
Though the Court conceded this concern was a legitimate state interest,
it held that “this interest cannot justify the very severe restrictions on
voting and associational rights which Ohio has imposed.”142
The Court similarly rejected Ohio’s other claimed interests, such as
decreasing voter confusion and ensuring an effective party structure.143
Thus, once a ballot-access law impinges on core associational rights, the
interest claimed by the state must surpass generalized concerns such as
preserving party systems and structure or reducing voter confusion.
In 1974, the Supreme Court applied a similar analysis to ballotaccess restrictions placed on independent candidates.144 In Storer v.
Brown, the Court held that Williams stood for “the proposition that the
requirements for an independent’s attaining a place on the general
election ballot can be unconstitutionally severe.”145 The California law
being challenged in Storer required independent candidates “to file a
petition signed by voters not less in number than 5% of the total votes
cast in California at the last general election.”146 The Court noted that
this percentage did not appear to be excessive based on its past
rulings.147 California law, however, did not allow voters who
participated in a party primary to sign an independent candidate’s
petition, which could make it significantly more difficult for an
independent candidate to obtain the necessary number of signatures.148
Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court
“to assess realistically whether the law imposes excessively
burdensome requirements upon independent candidates.”149
The Court also rejected the state’s argument that the signature
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31–32.
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 738.
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requirement did not matter because California had an established
system to allow new political parties to qualify for the ballot.150 The
Court explained that “the political party and the independent
candidate approaches to political activity are entirely different and
neither is a satisfactory substitute for the other.”151 Therefore, the Court
held that independent candidates could not be forced to join a political
party in order to gain access to the ballot.152 Mirroring the language of
Williams, the Court stated “we perceive no sufficient state interest in
conditioning ballot position for an independent candidate on his
forming a new political party as long as the State is free to assure itself
that the candidate is a serious contender, truly independent, and with a
satisfactory level of community support.”153
In subsequent rulings, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of its
holding in Williams. The Supreme Court examined numerous
restrictions on ballot access to determine which restrictions permissibly
furthered the policy goal of political stability and which restrictions
placed overly harsh burdens on the rights to vote and to associate.
In 1971, the Court upheld a law requiring that third-party
candidates file nominating petitions signed by five percent of eligible
voters.154 Additionally, in 1992, the Court upheld a prohibition on writein voting.155 However, in 1979 the Court struck down a law requiring
independent candidates and new political parties to obtain more than
25,000 signatures to appear on the ballot in Chicago.156 The Court also
struck down a law that created an early filing deadline for independent
candidates who wished to appear on the general election ballot.157
This series of cases demonstrates that while the Supreme Court is
willing to allow reasonable restrictions on access to the ballot that
advance other critical interests, it will not uphold laws that unduly
restrict or have the functional effect of completely barring third-party
and independent candidates from access to the ballot. Yet, that is the
very type of restriction that is part of the architecture—structural and
150. Id. at 745–46.
151. Id.at 745.
152. Id. at 746.
153. Id.
154. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
155. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441–42 (1992).
156. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187 (1979). The
unjustified burden resulted from the linkage of the numerosity requirement and the simultaneous
geographical distribution requirement. See id. at 186. For a more detailed explanation, see text
accompanying notes 242-45, infra.
157. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983).
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from a policy perspective—of judicial-retention elections.
B. First Amendment Challenges to Judicial Elections
The Court has applied strict scrutiny in First Amendment
challenges to judicial elections as well. In Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White,158 the Court held that Minnesota’s “announce
clause,” which barred a judicial candidate from “announc[ing] his or
her views on disputed legal or political issues,” 159 violated the plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights.160 The Court applied strict scrutiny to this
restriction because it burdened a core First Amendment freedom—
”speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office.”161 The
Court held that the announce clause failed both prongs of strict
scrutiny.162 The purported interest of impartiality—defined as a “lack
of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view”—was
not compelling because it was impossible, even undesirable, to find a
judge who met the respondent’s definition of impartiality.163 Even if
that interest—alternatively defined as “the lack of bias for or against
either party to the proceeding”164—were compelling, the announce
clause was not narrowly tailored to it; in fact, the Court ruled that “the
clause was barely tailored to serve that interest at all” because it only
barred speech against issues and not against particular parties.165
The Court has also applied strict scrutiny to a judicial election
restriction in a case where it identified sufficiently compelling interests
to uphold the law. In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,166 the Court applied
strict scrutiny to a Florida judicial conduct rule that prohibited judges
from personally soliciting campaign funds because “speech about
public issues and qualifications of candidates for elected office
commands the highest level of First Amendment protection.”167
Nevertheless, the Court found this to be the “rare case” in which a state
showed its speech restriction was narrowly tailored to serve a

158. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
159. Id. at 768.
160. Id. at 788.
161. Id. at 774.
162. See id. at 776–78 (analyzing the policy under both the narrow tailoring and compelling
government interest prongs of the strict scrutiny test and concluding that the State did not meet
its burden).
163. Id. at 777.
164. Id. at 775.
165. Id. at 776.
166. 575 U.S. 433 (2015).
167. Id. at 443.
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compelling state interest.168
The Court found compelling Florida’s twin interests of protecting
the judiciary’s integrity and maintaining the public’s confidence in an
impartial judiciary.169 The Court found that restricting personal
solicitation of campaign funds was narrowly tailored to those
compelling interests because it restricted “a narrow slice of speech” and
left judicial candidates free to discuss any issue other than personally
asking for campaign donations.170 While “[s]tates may regulate judicial
elections differently than they regulate political elections because the
role of judges differs from the role of politicians,”171 they may only do
so if the different treatment satisfies both prongs of strict scrutiny when
fundamental interests are at stake.172
In a third First Amendment challenge to a judicial selection process,
the Court did not apply strict scrutiny but did apply conventional
analysis in the judicial election process. In New York State Board of
Elections v. Lopez-Torres,173 a challenge to the state’s method for
selecting nominees for supreme court justice via a party convention,
plaintiff contended that the process violated his First Amendment
rights as a challenger to the candidates selected by party leadership.174
The Court did not apply strict scrutiny because the primary First
Amendment right cited by the respondent—the right for a political
party to structure its internal processes and choose its own
candidates—was a right of the party itself, not the respondent.175
Importantly, the Court applied conventional doctrine, applicable
generally to election nominations, without even suggesting that a
different approach was called for because a judicial election was at
issue.176

168. Id. at 444 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
169. See id. at 448.
170. Id. at 452.
171. Id. at 446.
172. Id. at 444. The canon at issue in Williams-Yulee only applied to trial judges, who are
selected through a contested election. Thus, the restrictive canon did not apply to the retention
elections that were used in Florida for appellate judges. It is questionable whether the rationale
for constraining the First Amendment interests in the context of contested elections, as applied
in Williams-Yulee, would necessarily translate to the merit-selection context, where appellate
judges are voted on in retention elections without competition.
173. 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
174. Id. at 201–02.
175. See id. at 203.
176. See id. at 205 (reviewing past Court treatment of election nomination procedures
without differentiating for judicial elections).
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C. Conventional Analysis Applies to Judicial Elections
The above cases demonstrate that judicial elections do not receive
a different constitutional analysis than traditional (representative)
elections. Some have asserted that the nature of the offices should lead
to differential treatment of these types of elections.177 However, despite
these differences, courts continue to scrutinize judicial elections under
the traditional constitutional doctrines—i.e., strict scrutiny—that
govern in election cases.
This is not to gainsay that there are inherent differences between
judges and other officials, and that those differences can shape the
application of traditional doctrines in the judicial election context. For
example, in Williams-Yulee, the Court, while applying strict scrutiny,
noted that “[s]tates may regulate judicial elections differently than they
regulate political elections, because the role of judges differs from the
role of politicians.”178 However, these differences have only been
highlighted and analyzed in circumstances substantially distinct from
uncontested merit-selection processes. Additionally, doctrinally, those
differences must be analyzed under strict scrutiny—as necessary to
promote a compelling interest—with the burden of justification on the
state.
In Williams-Yulee, the challenged Florida restrictions on personal
candidate fundraising applied to contested elections for trial judges, not
uncontested retention elections for appellate judges.179 Florida’s
decision to distinguish the need for restrictions on personal
solicitations by judges in the context of contested and uncontested
elections provides a good illustration of narrow tailoring when First
Amendment interests are at stake. The dangers to judicial integrity and
perceived impartiality were deemed by Florida (and found to be by the
Court) substantial when contested judicial elections are involved, but
those interests were not similarly at stake in the context of uncontested
appellate court retention elections.
The policy adopted by Florida and the judicial response in

177. For example, an amicus brief supporting Minnesota’s announce clause in White argued
that “the judiciary is different from the other two branches of government and thus needs special
rules to preserve the independence of the institution.” See Brief of Ad Hoc Committee of Former
Justices and Friends Dedicated to an Independent Judiciary as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 9, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521).
178. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015) (citing Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002)).
179. See id. at 439–40 (explaining the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct).
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Williams-Yulee reflected the application of the strict scrutiny tailoring
approach—limit restrictions on fundamental voting interests only as
necessary to promote compelling interests, but do not unnecessarily
abrogate those compelling interests in voting by doing away with the
contested elections themselves. Such elections affirm fundamental
voting interests, and they are an integral part of assuring the legitimacy
of the merit-selection system, particularly in states that require that
judges be elected.180 If contested judicial elections in some contexts or
in some ways pose dangers, then government must regulate against
those dangers in a targeted manner so as to safeguard the integrity of
the judicial process, but must not unnecessarily restrict the elections
themselves, which empower voters and promote fundamental
democratic interests.181
In both the statutory and constitutional contexts, the Court has
rejected arguments that judicial elections warrant different analytical
frameworks from other elections. In sum, the Court has held that state
judicial election systems are subject to the same federal statutory and
Constitutional analyses and requirements as are other, representative
elections.
The federal statutory context is reflected in Chisom v. Roemer,182
where the Court held that state judicial elections are subject to the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).183 At issue in Chisom was whether §
2 of the VRA applied to judicial elections, including its test for
determining whether a voting procedure resulted in abridging one’s
right to vote “on account of race or color.”184 Section 2(b) provides a
“totality of circumstances”185 test that assesses whether minority voters
have less opportunity to “elect representatives of their choice.”186 The
Court ruled that the term “representatives” included “winners of
representative, popular elections,” a definition broad enough to include
judges.187
Justice Stevens’ opinion specified that neither the Constitution nor
180. See Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 426 (Tenn. 2013) (holding that Tennessee fulfills
the state constitutional obligation to elect its judges by making appellate judges subject to
uncontested retention elections).
181. Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (reasoning that voting through provisions
such as referendums empowers people and “demonstrate[s] devotion to democracy”).
182. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
183. Id. at 404.
184. Id. at 390–91 (quoting 79 Stat. 437).
185. Id. at 394.
186. Id.at 388 (quoting 96 Stat. 134) (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 399.
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federal statutory law requires state judges to be elected; however, once
a state “has chosen a different course” and opted for a form of popular
election, the state’s judicial elections become subject to the VRA’s
requirements.188 In other words, state judicial elections are not different
than other “representative” elections for purposes of federal statutory
law under the VRA.
The same reasoning applies to federal constitutional challenges to
judicial retention elections, as evidenced by the Court’s opinion in
White. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, acknowledged that
Minnesota had the right to eliminate popular elections altogether;
however, he emphasized that “the greater power to dispense with
elections altogether does not include the lesser power to conduct
elections under conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance.”189 Once
a state “chooses to tap the energy and the legitimatizing power of the
democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process . . .
[their] First Amendment rights[].”190 Therefore, a state that chooses to
elect its judicial officials via a retention election must satisfy the federal
constitutional doctrinal requirements specified by the Court’s ballotaccess cases.
Justice O’Connor, who is no fan of judicial elections, concurred in
White.191 While she wrote “separately to express [her] concerns about
judicial elections generally,” she agreed that the regulation scheme
involved in Minnesota’s selection of judges was subject to the same
federal constitutional standards as other, representative elections.192
When uncontested judicial retention elections are evaluated under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, it becomes clear that retention
elections raise similar ballot-access issues to those addressed in
Williams and Storer. Since fundamental constitutional interests are
compromised, strict scrutiny applies. Retention elections infringe
personal rights to vote and to associate. Under the cases, a court should
apply strict scrutiny as the Court did in Williams and Storer, and, in the
188. Id. at 400.
189. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (citing Renne v.
Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
190. Id. (citing Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
191. In her concurrence in White, Justice O’Connor criticized judicial elections, suggesting it
is impossible for judges to ignore popular opinion when deciding cases in election systems—
likening it to “ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub”—and arguing that turning judges into elected
politicians erodes respect for the judiciary. See id. at 789 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Eule,
Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65
U. COLO. L. REV. 733, 739 (1994)).
192. Id. at 788.
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context of judicial elections, in White and Williams-Yulee.
Merit-selection systems bar access to the ballot completely. Only
one candidate, the incumbent judge, is permitted to have his or her
name on the ballot in a judicial retention election, which takes place at
the end of the incumbent judge’s term, and which determines who is
elected to serve a new term. All other potential candidates for judge,
either independents or members of another party, are prohibited from
having their names placed on the ballot. This monopoly to ballot access
places a significant burden on the rights of citizens to vote and to
associate. The rights to associate and join a political party mean little in
the context of judicial elections if a citizen does not have the option to
vote for a candidate of his or her choice or chosen party. Under the
ballot-access cases, the right to vote is significantly limited if voters only
have the option to make a decision about one candidate.
IV. RETENTION ELECTIONS UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS
As shown above, merit-selection systems present serious ballotaccess concerns that call for application of strict scrutiny, in line with
ballot-access cases generally. This Part will argue that strict scrutiny
analysis reveals the constitutional Achilles Heel of the merit-selection
system.
In order for judicial retention elections to survive strict scrutiny,
states must demonstrate that the laws are narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest.193 In the ballot-access cases, the Court has
recognized state interests in political stability and political compromise,
but has rejected giving a monopoly to the two major parties as a
compelling state interest.194 The Court has similarly rejected
justifications for eliminating ballot access in elections such as the
following: ensuring that election winners are the choice of a majority
of voters; decreasing voter confusion in a cluttered ballot; and ensuring
an effective party structure.195 These state interests are, if anything,
weaker in the context of judicial elections than in traditional
representative elections.
At the same time, there are state interests peculiar to judicial
elections that would qualify as compelling. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that protecting the integrity of the judiciary and

193. See, e.g., id. at 774.
194. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
195. Id. at 32–33.
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maintaining the public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary are
compelling interests.196 As a general matter, insulating judges from
certain aspects of the political process may be a reasonable, tailored
means of protecting judicial integrity; but it will be difficult for states
to demonstrate under strict scrutiny that laws establishing uncontested
judicial retention elections are narrowly tailored.
Laws are only narrowly tailored under strict scrutiny if they provide
the least restrictive means to achieve the compelling state interest in
question.197 To survive strict scrutiny analysis, states must shoulder the
burden to prove that neither competitive judicial elections nor
gubernatorial judicial appointments can succeed in assuring the
compelling interests that the court has recognized in the context of
judicial selection—protecting the judiciary’s integrity and maintaining
the public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary.
A. Compelling Interests and Narrow Tailoring: Judicial Integrity and
Impartiality
Under strict scrutiny, the system of uncontested retention elections
that characterizes merit selection must be shown to serve a compelling
state interest in a narrowly tailored manner. In the context of judicial
elections, the Supreme Court has only identified two interests it has
deemed compelling: promoting public confidence in judicial integrity,
from Williams-Yulee; and maintaining judicial impartiality, from White.
Courts define these particular interests narrowly, with careful precision.
Arguments designed to address generalized fears of public distrust or
judicial partiality will likely not suffice.198 And, under strict scrutiny, the
presumption of validity that normally attaches to state legislation is
reversed; the burden of justification rests with the state.
Merit selection—and the nominating commissions and uncontested
retention elections that characterize merit-selection systems—are
designed to insulate judges from what are perceived as the damaging

196. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444–45 (2015).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) (“When a
plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the
Government’s obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals.”);
Williams, 393 U.S. at 31 (applying “compelling state interest” standard in ballot-access context);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972) (applying compelling interest standard in voter
qualification context).
198. See White, 536 U.S. at 774–80 (proposing and analyzing various potential meanings of
judicial impartiality and concluding that the Minnesota regulation could not be upheld using that
state interest).

BLUMSTEIN_FORMATTED_4.5.22 (DO NOT DELETE)

126

4/14/2022 4:53 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

effects of the political process. Such claims are hotly contested; but, in
any event, those claims must be tested under strict scrutiny—which
focuses on the fit between merit selection as a system of selecting
judges and those claims. Under strict scrutiny, courts look into and
weigh the nature and degree of harm to the constitutional values
promoted by the ballot-access cases, and examine the availability of
alternatives such as appointment or elections with less-constrained
access to the ballot. Interests in support of merit selection must be
carefully and narrowly defined, as was done in White regarding the
concept of judicial impartiality, without reliance on general, abstract
concerns. Narrow tailoring analysis includes consideration of
alternative approaches that are less destructive to the constitutional
interests recognized in the ballot-access cases. Appointment and other
forms of election must be considered as alternatives.
1. Public Confidence in Judicial Integrity and Narrow Tailoring
Judges must be independent enough to strike down statutes that
violate state or federal constitutions, even if those statutes are popular
with voters.199 This requires judicial integrity, which must be clear to the
public. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in Williams-Yulee, “[u]nlike the
executive or the legislature, the judiciary ‘has no influence over either
the sword or the purse; ... neither force nor will but merely judgment.’
The judiciary’s authority therefore depends in large measure on the
public’s willingness to respect and follow its decisions.”200 Thus, even
the “public perception of judicial integrity is ‘a state interest of the
highest order.’”201
Merit selection, proponents contend, maintains public confidence
in judicial integrity by promoting judicial independence balanced with
some backstop of weak, truncated democratic accountability.
Democratic accountability, via elections, is a critical feature of merit
selection. Under its design, the Missouri Plan utilizes a nonpartisan
nominating commission to select a slate of qualified candidates for
review by the appointing official.202 This feature of merit-selection

199. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (“[I]t
is not to be inferred . . . that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination
happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the
existing Constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions.”).
200. Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 445–46 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (internal citations omitted)).
201. Id. at 446 (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)).
202. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial Selection and Their
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systems promotes independence by eliminating concerns that judges
will in some way provide a benefit for a coalition of interests that
elevated them to power.203 To maintain public faith in the system, some
mechanism for democratic accountability must exist—the retention
election.
To illustrate this concern, Professor Jeffrey Jackson highlights the
potential concern of a judge that “has a long history of ruling in favor
of one particular party, or in favor of criminal defendants in all
situations regardless of the facts of the case.”204 If no manner of political
accountability existed, allowing for the removal of the judge in an
election, the public might lose faith in judicial integrity. Therefore,
uncontested retention elections maintain enough democratic
accountability to maintain the perceived legitimacy of the system. Thus,
proponents of the Missouri Plan claim the system maintains public
confidence in the judiciary by protecting judges from the damaging
effects of contested political elections and protecting the public from
extreme and unrestrained judges.
Even if it were constitutionally permissible to take the politics out
of elections by restricting ballot access and thereby impairing the
constitutional values and interests that have been recognized and
vindicated in the ballot-access cases, there is reason to believe merit
selection does not eliminate the role of politics in judicial selection.
Under strict scrutiny, the burden is on the state to show that the meritselection system does in fact and in a narrowly tailored manner further
a compelling interest of protecting public confidence in the judiciary.
In evaluating the claim that the Missouri Plan eliminates the role of
politics in selecting judges, Professor Brian Fitzpatrick of Vanderbilt
Law School argues that merit-selection systems merely change the
political venue of these decisions.205 Professor Fitzpatrick is “skeptical
that merit selection removes politics from judicial selection,” arguing
that the process “may simply move politics” away from democratic
processes and into the nominating commissions.206 In his view, “relative
to other methods of selection in use today—elections and
appointments by elected officials—[the nominating commissions and

Application to a Commission-Based System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 125, 133 (2007) (describing
the Missouri Plan’s design).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 676 (2009).
206. Id.
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uncontested retention elections] transfer power over judicial selection
from the electorate to the bar.”207 Though merit selection may partially
insulate judges from the political process, it does not eliminate the
effect of politics emanating from the nominating commission. Professor
Fitzpatrick notes that “[t]o believe that politics is deemphasized in
merit systems, one would have to believe that the commissions who
nominate candidates would exhibit greater indifference to” politics
than the public.208 Therefore, even though the Missouri Plan might alter
some of the deleterious effects of democratic politics, merit-selection
systems might only insulate judges from the democratic process, not
from politics generally. And the burden of persuasion in this debate
under strict scrutiny is on states that adopt merit selection and restrict
access to the retention election ballot.
Judicial integrity “does not easily reduce to precise definition, nor
does it lend itself to proof by documentary record,” so states that adopt
merit-selection systems must provide courts with a specific articulation
and evidence of how the nominating commissions and uncontested
retention elections support this interest.209 The ballot-access limitations
of the merit-selection system impinge on core associational and voting
interests. Once a restriction infringes these interests, arguments that the
restriction addresses generalized concerns are insufficient to sustain
them. For example, in Williams v. Rhodes,210 general concerns about
political stability and promoting compromise through a two-party
system were insufficient to sustain the ballot access restrictions at
issue.211 Similarly, in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party,212 the state interest of “avoiding overloaded ballots” could not
sustain ballot restrictions.213 Thus, states that seek to defend a meritselection system will likely have to make specific, evidence-based,
nuanced arguments that the system protects public confidence in the
judiciary in particular, unique ways. This burden will likely prove very
difficult for states that seek to defend merit-selection systems.

207. Id. at 679.
208. Id. at 686.
209. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 447 (2015).
210. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
211. See id. at 31–32.
212. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
213. See id. at 186 (questioning why this state interest required more restrictive measures for
Chicago than the rest of the state).
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2. Impartiality and Narrow Tailoring
Another potential compelling interest purportedly advanced by
merit-selection systems could be judicial impartiality. As a threshold
matter, a claim of “impartiality” as a basis for restricting access to the
ballot—as a means of promoting a compelling interest in judicial
integrity—would need to specify the meaning of the surprisingly broad
term. In White, the Court provided a thorough discussion of the
possible meanings of the term “impartiality” in the judicial context.214
It provided three possible definitions, stating that “impartiality” could
be (i) the lack of bias for or against the parties in the litigation, (ii) the
lack of bias for or against particular legal views, or (iii) a general quality
of “openmindedness.”215 The Court rejected the second definition out
of hand as a compelling interest because a judge without any particular
legal views is “evidence of lack of qualification, not a lack of bias.”216
While the court did not explicitly deem the other definitions as
compelling interests because the restriction failed the means-end
relationship prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, discussions of each
definition are enlightening. The first definition of impartiality—lack of
bias against particular parties—appears in line with the traditional
definition of the term, particularly in the due process context.217 But as
Justice O’Connor noted in her White concurrence, “the very practice of
electing judges undermines this interest.”218 Bias is an inherent part of
any election process. As Justice O’Connor observed, the state chose to
“elect its judges through contested popular elections instead of through
an appointment system or a combined appointment and retention
election system along the lines of the Missouri Plan. In doing so the
State has voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias . . . .”219 By
limiting democratic involvement with judicial selection, merit selection
seeks to reduce the bias from contested elections and, it is claimed,
protects public confidence in judicial integrity by promoting the
214. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–80 (2002).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 778 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)).
217. See id. at 776 (collecting cases illustrating this definition of impartiality in the due process
context).
218. Id. at 788 (“But if judges are subject to regular elections they are likely to feel that they
have at least some personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case.”). See also Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400–01 (1991) (“The fundamental tension between the ideal character of
the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by crediting judges
with total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for elected
office.”).
219. White, 536 U.S. at 792.
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perception of impartiality. This claim of impartiality must be tested
under strict scrutiny—i.e., it must not only be demonstrated to be
present as a compelling interest, but also it must be narrowly tailored
to achieve the demonstrated compelling interest.
Further, impartiality could be understood as “openmindedness,” or
a willingness to “consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and
remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case.”220
While the Court did not explicitly endorse this interest as compelling,
merit selection proponents could argue that it is compelling, and that
nominating commissions can properly consider such traits of potential
judges.
B. Narrow Tailoring: Alternatives to Judicial Retention Elections
There are two common alternatives to judicial retention elections
that would not raise the same ballot-access issues as retention elections.
The first alternative is contested judicial elections featuring multiple
candidates. Election systems could include the introduction of
professional review entities that inform voters of judicial temperament
and similar qualifications, yet do not curtail ballot access as judicialretention elections do. The second alternative is a system of
gubernatorial appointments and legislative confirmation, analogous to
the system for selecting federal judges. Proponents of merit-selection
systems would contend that these alternatives cannot succeed in
achieving the compelling state interests of protecting public confidence
in judicial integrity or protecting judicial impartiality, and thus meritselection systems must be deemed narrowly tailored. But it would seem
that existing alternatives suffice as acceptable means of protecting state
interests, causing retention elections to fail under strict scrutiny. Indeed,
judicial elections originated, in part, to divest control of judges from
political officials and to provide political accountability and oversight
to voters, respecting political interests of voters.221
1. Competitive Judicial Elections
One of the biggest potential objections to judicial elections is that
judicial candidates will be forced to solicit donations from special
interest groups and then feel beholden to those special interest groups
if they win. One empirical study confirmed “a significant relationship

220. Id. at 778.
221. See supra Part II.A.
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between business group contributions to state supreme court justices
and the voting of those justices in cases involving business matters.”222
The data demonstrate that “the empirical relationship between
business contributions and justices’ voting for business interests exists
only in partisan and nonpartisan systems.”223 The study found “no
statistically significant relationship between money and voting in
retention election systems.”224
Another potential objection to judicial elections is that judges will
not treat criminal defendants fairly because they are concerned about
the political consequences of appearing weak on crime. Business
groups, which have no special connection to criminal law, often run
advertisements criticizing the criminal records of judges they do not
support.225 This strategy appears to have affected judges’ sentencing
practices. Empirical studies have demonstrated that “judges facing
imminent elections are less likely to overturn criminal convictions.”226
Similar to data about campaign contributions, “this tendency was
highest in partisan elections and not as significant in retention
elections.”227
From these data it can be concluded that campaign contributions
and negative advertising have a greater effect on judges who are forced
to run in contested elections than judges who are only subject to
retention elections. Therefore, it can be argued that contested elections
are not an alternative that can succeed in achieving the compelling
state interest of promoting public confidence in judicial integrity or
assuring judicial impartiality.
The result in Williams-Yulee demonstrates how a properly
regulated election process can result in a narrowly tailored solution in
this context. In Williams-Yulee, the Court upheld the state bar canon

222. Joanna Shepherd, Justice at Risk: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and
CONSTITUTION
SOCIETY
(June,
2013),
Judicial
Decisions,
AMERICAN
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/olduploads/originals/documents/JusticeAtRisk_Nov2013.pdf.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Billy Corriher, Merit Selection and Retention Elections Keep Judges Out of Politics,
FOR
AMERICAN
PROGRESS
ACTION
FUND
(Nov.
1,
2012),
CENTER
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/JudicialElectionsPart3-C4-2.pdf.
Examples of this strategy include a pro-tort reform group in Washington running an
advertisement criticizing a judge for letting a convicted murderer go free and a coal company in
West Virginia criticizing a judge for giving probation to a child abuser.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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prohibiting judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign
donations in contested elections.228 In its determination, the Court
found that holding the election, but limiting the personal solicitation of
funds, represented a narrowly tailored solution that furthered the
compelling state interest of protecting public confidence in judicial
integrity.229 Thus, Williams-Yulee is a proof-of-concept for the notion
that states can adjust the regulation of contested elections to survive
strict scrutiny, as the state found the proper balance there.
In addition, as a safeguard for judicial integrity and independence
(and the appearance thereof), there are due process limits to political
excesses. For example, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,230 the
Supreme Court established constitutional constraints on the ability of
litigants to influence judges through large campaign contributions.231
Caperton establishes a constitutional limitation that constrains political
excesses, short of abandoning traditional elections or election
principles such as ballot-access protections.
Further, this broad attack on judicial elections generally calls into
question a system that many states historically have chosen as a means
for selecting their judges and ignores the role that politics still plays in
retention elections. Twenty-two states use some sort of traditional,
contested judicial election—partisan or non-partisan—to select the
judges on their high courts.232
Most states began to shift to an election system in the nineteenth
century in order to “increase courts’ independence and their power to
check the [state] legislature,” in addition to adding a more democratic
check on the judiciary.233 Given their popularity and their important
role in establishing political oversight and accountability of the
judiciary, a court should find that a properly regulated election system
that comports with ballot-access rules can adequately insulate judges
from the improper aspects of the political process. Indeed, advocates
for judicial elections argue that merit selections do not eliminate
political influences, but merely replace them “with a somewhat
subterranean process of bar and bench politics, in which there is little
228. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 455 (2015).
229. Id.
230. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
231. Id. at 889.
232. See Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (last updated
October 4, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selectionsignificant-figures.
233. Shugerman, supra note 34, at 1098.
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popular control.”234 These concerns echo the suspicions of Professor
Fitzpatrick, who believes the politics of judicial selection via the
Missouri Plan merely change the political venue from the public to the
bar associations.235 The anecdotal cynic asks the political or bar leader:
Who is going to be merit selected this year? These subtler political
activities—the proverbial smoke-filled parlor room discussions—were
the impetus for many states to shift to judicial elections in the first
place. And, of course, the analysis under strict scrutiny places the
burden of justification for the retention-election system on the state,
since it impinges on fundamental interests of voters as recognized for
over fifty years in the ballot-access cases.
2. Judicial Appointments
Another alternative to merit-selection systems as a means to
protect public confidence in judicial integrity and to ensure judicial
impartiality is the appointment system similar to that used to select
federal judges. The federal system does not require popular judicial
elections or any form of oversight by the political branches once a judge
is confirmed by the Senate. Just as nominating commissions can be seen
as reducing the role of politics in choosing judges, appointments could
be viewed similarly; the decision rests with one appointing official,
advised as that official deems appropriate. Thus, the federal model of
an appointment system represents an alternative to merit selection. It
is a traditional and longstanding means of insulating sitting judges from
politics and protecting judicial integrity and impartiality. And, by
eliminating elections, a non-elective system of appointments does not
come within the ballot-access cases, which only apply to elections, not
appointments.236
In addition, Supreme Court precedent has demonstrated that
ballot-access regulations that limit ballot access—without eliminating
it—can survive strict scrutiny, and thus represent a less restrictive
means to achieve the appropriate compelling state interests. For
example, in Storer v. Brown,237 the Court upheld a ballot-access
restriction that barred independent candidates from the general
election ballot if they had either: (1) voted in the immediately

234. Michael DeBow, et al., THE CASE FOR PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 33 U. TOL. L.
REV. 393 (2002).
235. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 205, at 676.
236. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
237. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
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preceding primary; or (2) had been a registered member of a party at
any time within a year of the preceding primary.238 The Court identified
the compelling state interest as eliminating “unrestrained factionalism”
and promoting political stability.239 For the Court, those ballot-access
restrictions represented a permissible means of achieving this vital
state interest.240
On the other hand, laws that effectively bar ballot access to
candidates have never been upheld under strict scrutiny.241 In Illinois
Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,242 a political party
challenged a state law regarding petition signature requirements for
independent candidates and new political parties.243 For statewide
races, these candidates and parties had to get 25,000 signatures, but
local races only required a number equal to 5% of the municipality’s
voter total in the previous election for the position.244 Given the size of
Chicago and its number of voters, this system led to the anomalous
result of local candidates requiring more than the 25,000 signatures
needed by statewide candidates.245 Because this “historical accident”
served as a complete bar on ballot access, the law could not survive
strict scrutiny.
The same result occurred in Williams v. Rhodes, where the state
“made it virtually impossible for a new political party . . . to be placed
on a state ballot.”246 The Court has made it clear that total bars on ballot
access will not be accepted, but certain limitations in pursuit of
compelling state interests will. Under this view, some type of ballotaccess limitations or preferences for judges seeking a new term through
retention could represent a less restrictive means of protecting judicial
integrity and impartiality than the total bar created by judicial
retention elections.
In sum, competitive judicial elections, including some limited,
targeted ballot-access restrictions or preferences if desired—but short
of the total exclusion of ballot access under merit selection—and
238. Id. at 726.
239. Id. at 736.
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31–32 (1968) (failing under strict scrutiny
because the state failed to identify a compelling interest to sustain the functional bar on ballot
access to third-party candidates).
242. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
243. Id. at 178.
244. See id. at 176.
245. See id. at 177.
246. Williams, 393 U.S. at 24.
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appointments can provide sufficient means to address the relevant state
interests. States would be allowed to generate sufficient regulations to
protect compelling state interests, but would not be allowed to embrace
the total ballot-access exclusion of merit selection. States can find the
right balance in these solutions between running effective, competitive
elections, as twenty-two states do, and still maintain public confidence
in judicial integrity and impartiality. Once these alternatives are
identified, are available, and sufficiently protective of the compelling
interests at stake, these options represent sufficient alternatives under
the narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny. Accordingly, arguments
that judicial-retention elections under existing merit-selection systems
are necessary to promote a compelling interest should have a hard time
satisfying strict scrutiny.
V. DO RETENTION ELECTIONS FIT WITHIN THE RECALL ELECTION
PARADIGM?
The next question is whether succor for judicial retention elections
under merit selection can arise from an analogy to recall elections,
which provide an opportunity for voters to remove a sitting
officeholder from office before his or her term has expired. Some recall
election procedures constrain candidate ballot access; so, one could see
an argument being advanced that retention elections should be
characterized as a species of recall and should be acceptable on that
basis.
While not all merit-selection systems fit a single mode, and not all
state constitutional provisions are uniform, the analogy of retention
elections to recall elections will not likely save merit-selection retention
elections.
The closest call is a claim that a judicial selection system is
appointive in character, with the retention elections part of and a check
on an appointive process. Systems of appointment are not governed by
the election cases. But even in those circumstances, a retention election
built into the judicial selection process—and serving a political
legitimation function—should be properly characterized as a selection
via an election, not a recall. The strongest case for application of
traditional strict scrutiny is the situation in which a retention election
fulfills a state’s constitutional obligation to fill judicial positions by
election, not appointment.247
247. In Tennessee, for example, before its Constitution was amended to allow expressly for
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Overall, given the important differences between merit-selection
retention elections and recall processes, analogies to recall elections
likely fail to save merit selection from invalidation under strict scrutiny
as required by the ballot-access cases.
A. Recall Elections: In General
Nineteen states allow for recall elections, in which voters can vote
to replace state officials before the expiration of the officeholder’s
term.248 The procedure for holding a recall election is governed by the
state’s constitution or the statute authorizing the recall election.249 In
six states, the election for a replacement is held at the same time as the
recall election. This is known as simultaneous recall.250 In the other
thirteen states, the recall ballot only asks whether the official should be
replaced.251 If the official is recalled, a replacement will be appointed
by the governor or a special election will be held at a later date.252
Most of the highly publicized recall elections have taken place in
states that employ the simultaneous model. In 2003, the Democratic
Governor of California, Gray Davis, was recalled and replaced by
Republican movie star Arnold Schwarzenegger.253 The first question on
the California recall ballot asked only whether Davis should be
recalled.254 The second question asked voters to select a replacement

a hybrid appointment and retention election process, the state Constitution mandated that judges
be elected. The retention election was deemed to be an election that fulfilled the constitutional
duty to elect judges. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409 (Tenn. 2014). Where the retention
election fulfills a state constitutional obligation to elect judges, then the ballot-access cases would
seem to apply, and the recall election paradigm would not seem to fit.
248. Recall of State Officials, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sep. 15,
2021), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-of-state-officials.aspx.
249. Id.
250. Id. Simultaneous recall elections can take two forms. In Colorado and California, voters
are sent a ballot with two questions. Id. The first question asks whether the state official should
be recalled. Id. The second question asks voters to pick a replacement candidate for the office.
Id. The official being recalled cannot be listed as a candidate on the second question. Id. If a
majority of voters vote to recall the official, the second ballot question is used to select the
official’s replacement. Id. If a majority of voters vote against the recall, the second question is
moot, and the official remains in office. Id. In the other four states that require simultaneous recall
elections, the certification of a recall petition essentially triggers a special election. Id. The recall
ballot in these states will only consist of a list of candidates running for the office. Id. The official
who is being recalled may appear on the ballot along with the other candidates. Id. Wisconsin and
Arizona automatically place the officials on the ballot, unless they resign their office. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Davis Concedes, Schwarzenegger wins, CNN (October 8, 2003, 4:20 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/recall.main/.
254. Id.
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for the Governor.255 135 candidates appeared on the ballot to replace
Davis.256 This included the Democratic Party’s preferred replacement
for Davis, Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante.257 California voters
voted yes on the first question, removing Davis from office, and
simultaneously, in response to the second question, chose
Schwarzenegger as Davis’s replacement.258
In 2012, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker survived a recall attempt
over his decision to cut collective bargaining rights for public employee
unions.259 The Wisconsin recall ballot contained only one question,
asking voters to pick their preferred candidate for governor.260 Walker
was automatically placed on the ballot as the incumbent state official
being recalled.261 Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett won a Democratic
primary to appear on the ballot as the Democratic nominee challenging
Walker.262 Therefore, while the election was triggered by a recall
petition, it functioned as a traditional, contested special election,
observing traditional ballot-access rules.263
In 2013, two Democratic state legislators in Colorado were recalled
for their support of gun control legislation.264 Similar to California,
Colorado uses a two question ballot for its simultaneous recall election;
however, that recall election functioned differently from the California
gubernatorial recall.265 The first question on the ballot asked whether
the legislators should be recalled, and the second question asked voters
to select a replacement.266 Democrats did not nominate or place
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. In 2021, California had a recall election regarding Governor Gavin Newsom. At the
threshold, that process led to a vote not to recall Gov. Newsom, so the second stage was not
reached. For a report on the unsuccessful recall election, see Kathleen Ronayne and Michael R.
Blood, California Gov. Gavin Newsom beats back GOP-led recall, AP (Sept. 15, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/california-recall-results-gavin-newsoma590782877be099d44f1766b2d138394.
259. Walker Survives Wisconsin Recall Vote, NEW YORK TIMES (June 5, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/us/politics/walker-survives-wisconsin-recalleffort.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Jack Healy, Colorado Lawmakers Ousted in Recall Vote Over Gun Law, NEW YORK
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/us/colorado-lawmaker-concedesdefeat-in-recall-over-gun-law.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
265. Colorado Election Results, SECRETARY OF STATE SCOTT GESSLER (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/CO/47986/118604/en/summary.html.
266. Id.
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candidates on the ballot for the second question, ensuring victory for
the Republican nominees if the Democratic legislators were recalled.267
Therefore, while the election formally employed a two question ballot,
it functioned as a special election between the Democratic incumbents
and the Republican challengers.268
Legal challenges have not been successful in stopping recall
elections of state officials. Numerous state and federal lawsuits were
brought in attempts to enjoin the 2003 California recall election, none
of which were successful.269 While none of the challenges prevented the
recall election from occurring, a federal district court in Partnoy v.
Shelley270 did hold that California could not require citizens to vote on
the recall question in order to have their vote in the succession election
counted.271 The court explained that the California law would
“effectively bar Plaintiffs from having their otherwise valid vote for a
gubernatorial successor counted, or compel them to vote on a separate
issue upon which they do not wish to vote.”272 Therefore, the Court held
that the California law placed “a severe restriction on [the Plaintiffs’]
Constitutional right to vote.”273 The Partnoy case demonstrates that the
rules surrounding recall elections can invoke election-law principles
and doctrines and can place constitutionally impermissible burdens on
the rights to vote and to associate.
So, the natural question is whether the paradigm of recall elections,
where (in many states) only one candidate might be on the ballot,
insulates judicial retention elections from the constitutional
requirements of the ballot-access cases. Elections, including retention
elections, that select officials for office likely come within the scope of
the ballot-access cases. Recall elections that undo the outcome of an
election and force an incumbent from office during his or her term of
office would seem to call for a different analysis.
B. Should Judicial Retention Elections Be Characterized as Recall
Elections?
Some states are required by their state constitutions to select judges
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Kenneth P. Miller, The Davis Recall and the Courts, AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH
(Mar. 2005), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1532673X04272729.
270. 277 F.Supp.2d 1064 (S.D.Cal. 2003).
271. Id. at 1075.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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via an election. A retention election can qualify as an election, a form
of selecting judges, and thereby satisfy the state constitutional
requirement for voting.274 In such circumstances, the retention election
is the election for selecting judges as required by state law. The ballotaccess cases would seem to fit such circumstances, and the ballot-access
standards would apply. Restricting access to the ballot to a single
incumbent in such cases would likely be subject to strict scrutiny and
would come up short for the reasons already discussed.
On the other hand, a system of pure judicial appointments would
not be covered by the ballot-access cases, which do not apply to
appointment systems.275 Judicial merit selection that is based on a state
constitution that allows for judicial appointment and formalized
retention elections—a hybrid system—raises more nuanced questions.
Recall elections are dissimilar from retention elections in important
ways. Recall elections occur outside of the regular election process and
are distinct from the underlying process of selecting officials for office.
Recall elections undo elections and are designed to correct or
supersede an election outcome. There is a threshold requirement for a
recall election, typically a petition; a recall is not a routine part of an
election process but distinct from it. Once that threshold for recall is
satisfied, by the petition or a two-step voting process, a replacement
process occurs.
Voters participating in a recall election already had access to the
ballot with an opportunity to vote for their desired candidate. The recall
election is a way of allowing voters to discipline an official who had
been chosen in compliance with normal election-law requirements. It is
designed to undo the results of an election, with provisions for an
election in the case of a successful recall. That subsequent selection
election—even in the context of simultaneous recalls—and the original
election would be compliant with ballot-access requirements. Ballotaccess principles apply to the initial election and to the replacement
election.
In a merit-selection judicial-retention system, the requirements of
the ballot-access cases are eviscerated so that the voter-based
constitutional values of ballot access are not honored. The retention
election is integral to the process, not a corrective of the electoral
outcome in a special, distinct procedure with significant triggering
274. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409 (Tenn. 2013).
275. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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requirements. The retention election is an essential, democratizing
component of a merit-selection system, and it occurs at the end of a
judge’s term of office. The retention election is designed to select a
judge to office for a new term. No petition is needed; the retention
election is routine, scheduled, and designed to limit the scope of the
election to a single candidate --- the incumbent judge. This is what the
ballot-access cases deal with and are driven by—opening access to the
ballot in an election process designed to select (not deselect) a
candidate for office
In this regard, a recall election is more similar to an impeachment
or popular removal process. To return to the example of Governor
Davis, Californians had two means to remove Davis from the
governor’s office—a recall election decided by California’s voters or an
impeachment process decided by the Assembly.276 The recall election
was one means of removal during the governor’s term because the
voters were dissatisfied with Davis’ performance,277 even though he did
not commit any “misconduct in office” as required for impeachment.278
Like impeachment, recall is a means of removal that serves as a check
on the election process—an opportunity to remove an official who has
already been elected via a constitutionally valid election. And the
removal comes during the office holder’s term, not at the end of the
term when the issue involves selection of a person for a new term via
an election process. Targeting a single candidate in a recall process may
be appropriate in the context of undoing a selection during a term but
not so in the context of selecting a candidate at the end of a term for a
new term of office.
In sum, judicial retention elections are an integral, planned method
of selection for a new term in a position, rather than a method of
removal from a position. Tennessee’s constitution, for example, states
that judges, as part of a hybrid system, “shall be elected in a retention
election by the qualified voters of the state.”279 Recall elections occur
outside the normal, periodic election cycles and are designed, with
procedural hurdles, to remove a specific, duly-elected official from a
position to which he or she was elected and from a position in which he

276. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 18.
277. Davis
Concedes,
Schwarzenegger
wins,
CNN
(October
8,
2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/recall.main/ (citing a “whopping 72 percent”
disapproval rating for Davis).
278. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 18.
279. See TN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (emphasis added).
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or she is serving during the term of office originally contemplated.
Retention elections are a form of popular election to a new term in
office; recall elections and other checks on the election process are
special instruments for undoing or superseding an election and can
result in removal from office during an office holder’s term of office.
CONCLUSION
Merit-selection systems have long been challenged yet never
toppled. This Article has identified a new potential arrow for a
challenger’s quiver. By casting the judicial retention election as a
complete bar to the ballot for candidates, challengers can utilize the
Court’s ballot-access jurisprudence to their advantage. The resulting
strict scrutiny could lead to the invalidation of the law, as the judicial
retention election is not narrowly tailored to protect a compelling state
interest. Alternatives to judicial retention election systems exist—
contested elections and systems of appointment without elections. By
challenging the merit-selection system under the ballot-access
paradigm and related ballot-access cases, challengers to retention
elections in a merit-selection system may well have a path to success.
If they adopt an appointment system of judicial selection, like the
federal system, states can avoid the implications of the ballot-access
cases and avoid having judicial elections; but once a state chooses to
hold an election, relying on the legitimating role of an election as a
means of selecting judges and holding them politically accountable, it
chooses to subject its election process to the relevant federal election
laws such as the Voting Rights Act and the Supreme Court’s ballotaccess jurisprudence.280
The United States Constitution does not prohibit states from
appointing officials, including judges, as opposed to electing them.281
States are given “vast leeway in the management of [their] internal
affairs.”282 Laws creating appointment processes completely eliminate
access to the ballot,but that lack of ballot access does not raise federal
constitutional issues because states have sovereign power to determine
how to fill vacancies in state and local offices.283
Absent a state’s decision to hold an election for judicial office, even
280. See supra Part III.C.
281. Sailors v. Board of Ed. of Kent Cty., 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967). See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
282. Sailors, 387 U.S. at 109.
283. Id.
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a retention election, there is no federal constitutional claim under the
ballot-access cases. Such a claim only applies to state elections, not state
systems of appointment. Appointments occur outside of the election
process and, therefore, avoid ballot-access issues altogether. A state
does not place a substantial burden on a ballot when it appoints an
official to the office—it permissibly eliminates the ballot entirely. And
the Constitution does not prevent states from eliminating the ballot
entirely through an appointment process284—the federal model.285
Once a state “has chosen a different course” and opted for a form of
popular election, that state subjects its judicial selection process to
federal election law.286
The Court provided similar instruction in White.287 Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence noted that states have multiple permissible
options for their judicial selection systems.288 The majority opinion also
made clear, however, that the power to choose between an
appointment or election system does not provide the state with power
to avoid the Federal Constitution altogether once a state chooses an
election system.289 Likewise, a state that chooses a judicial meritselection system chooses to hold retention elections. Therefore, the
state chooses to subject itself to the Court’s ballot-access jurisprudence,
even though it has the power to avoid ballot-access issues altogether
had it chosen to appoint its judges. Elections confer a form of political
legitimacy, but they also trigger constitutional requirements regarding
access to the ballot; the sweet of political legitimacy comes with what,
for some, is the bitter of having to comply with the ballot-access cases
by opening up the retention election to some form of broader ballot
access.

284. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400–01 (1991) (holding that Louisiana’s judicial
elections had to comply with the Federal Voting Rights Act because its judges were
“representatives” for purposes of the law); see also supra Part III.C.
285. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
286. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400; see also Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S.1095, 1097–98 (1973) (White,
J., dissenting) (“We have held that a state may dispense with certain elections altogether. . . . What
I had thought the apportionment decisions at least established is the simple constitutional
principle that, subject to narrow exceptions, once a State chooses to select officials by popular
vote, each qualified voter must be treated with an equal hand and not be subjected to irrational
discrimination based on his residence.”) (citations omitted).
287. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 787–88 (2002).
288. Id. at 791–92.
289. Id. at 788.

